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would begin to run on a declaratory judgment action when "the controversy, which is the subject of the action, is known to exist." 2 How-

ever, this rule is susceptible to criticism because its application may
lead to results which are patently unjust. This fact is well illustrated
by the decision reached by the Appellate Division, Second Department,
29
in Sorrentino v. Mierzwa.
In Sorrentino, the plaintiff brought an action for a declaration of
her marital status, in order to establish her eligibility for a widow's
pension from the New York City Police Department. In 1951 her
husband had obtained a Nevada "divorce" and had remarried on the
same day the divorce decree was rendered. Plaintiff contended that
the divorce was void because of her now deceased husband's failure to
establish a bona fide residence in Nevada. The supreme court declared
the Nevada divorce void, but the appellate division reversed, and citing
Freund, held that the statute began to run when the plaintiff first
became aware that her marital status was in dispute, i.e., in 1951.
The Court of Appeals, 30 in turn, reversed the appellate division, pointing out that if the Freund rule were to be upheld the plaintiff would
lose her right to a widow's pension before that right matured. The
Court opted for what it deemed to be a more reasonable rule:
Notwithstanding the existence of a justiciable controversy which
has given rise to the right to bring an action for a declaratory
judgment, appellant was free to bring the instant action so long
as the Statute of Limitations had not barred the enforcement of her
right to the pension fund.8 1
Thus, the Court not
mencement of the statute
the declaratory judgment
applied if the traditional
to the pension fund) had

only established a rule governing the comof limitations, but also held applicable to
action the same statute which would have
remedy (enforcement of the widow's right
been sought.8 2
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28 208 Misc. at 662, 144 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
29 30 App. Div. 2d 549, 290 N.Y.S.2d 585 (2d Dep't 1968).
30 25 N.Y.2d 59, 250 N.E.2d 58, 302 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1969).
31 Id. at 63, 250 N.E.2d at 60, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
32Accord, Calder v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 4 Misc. 2d 166, 156 N.Y.S.2d 494
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1956); Riesner v. Young, 198 Misc. 624, 100 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1950). But cf. Simeti v. Commissioner of Welfare, 212 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1961) (dictum). See generally 1 WK&M 1 213.02 (1969).
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Two courts, one federal 33 and one state,34 have recently reex-

amined the requisite elements of the agency relationship upon Which
jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary defendant can be predicated under
CPLR 302(a)(1). In the past, the courts have consistently distinguished
between the work of an "agent" and of an "independent contractor"
in order to determine whether a nondomiciliary employer was subject
to the jurisdiction of the New York courts. If the employee were found
to be an "agent," his principal would be subjected to in personam jurisdiction in the state for actions arising out of the agent's acts. 35 A
finding that the employee was an "independent contractor," however,
would preclude the court from imposing personal jurisdiction over
the defendant-employer.30 Such hair-splitting, which led to critical
definitions of "agent" and "agency," has at times fostered harsh and
rather absurd results.3 7
In Orient Mid-East Lines, Inc. v. Albert E. Bowen, Inc., 38 Blackwood Hodge Ltd. (Blackwood), a foreign distributor for General
Motors, sought to have ten dump trucks shipped to it in India. Blackwood, after numerous communications with Albert E. Bowen, Inc.
(Bowen), a New York corporation, requested the latter to secure passage
of this freight order. Bowen made an oral booking with Orient MidEast Lines, Inc. (Orient),39 a shipper of goods, but it subsequently
learned that the release for the cargo would be delayed. And because of
additional delays, the cargo was never shipped by Orient, which then
sought to obtain jurisdiction in an action for breach of contract against
Blackwood by virtue of Bowen's acts in New York as Blackwood's
"agent." As Judge Tyler noted, the situation was somewhat novel
since jurisdictional issues arising from an alleged agency relation33 Orient Mid-East Lines, Inc. v. Albert E. Bowen, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D.N.Y.

1969).
34 Elman v. Belson, 32 App. Div. 2d 422, 302 N.Y.S.2d 961 (2d Dep't 1969).
35 See, e.g., Hertz, Newmark & Warner v. Fischman, 53 Misc. 2d 418, 279 N.Y.S.2d

97 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
36 See, e.g., Glassman v. Ryder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 244 N.E2d 259, 296 N.YS.2d 783 (1968).
See also The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. R v. 313, 321 (1969).
ST For example, in Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 31 App. Div. 2d 276, 297
N.YS.2d 151 (Ist Dep't 1969), a California resident participated in a New York auction via
telephone and, after making two successful bids, refused to tender payment. In a suit
by the seller, the appellate division refuted the contention that the defendant had
"transacted business" in New York, holding that the auctioneer was the "agent" of the
seller and not the buyer. Thus, no acts of the defendant were available to support the
jurisdiction in the New York action. However, the Court of Appeals recently reversed this
holding in a 5 to 2 decision which recognized the inadequacies of a simple agency
approach. - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d - - N.Y.S.2d - (1970).
38297 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
3O Whether or not a valid contract was made by Bowen with Orient was unclear
and immaterial for a ruling by the court on the jurisdictional basis for suit.
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ship ordinarily appear in suits by the agent against the nondomiciliary
40
defendant.
The court dispensed with the requirement of an exclusive agency4 '
in finding that Blackwood's acts had subjected the company to jurisdiction in New York. Judge Tyler stated that the important consideration was actually whether or not "the principal [requested] purposeful
acts by a person in New York for the benefit of the foreign corporate
defendant.1 42 Blackwood intended to obtain possession of the trucks
for the corporate purpose of selling them to the Indian Government.
And the acts performed in New York by Bowen with a view to accomplishing this purpose 43 were sufficient to support jurisdiction over
Blackwood under CPLR 302(a)(1).
In Elman v. Belson,44 the Appellate Division, Second Department,
reversed a decision of the supreme court4 5 which held that jurisdiction
had been obtained over an Illinois defendant only if his Chicago
attorneys had acted pursuant to his instructions when they employed
a New York law firm to represent him in another action. The New
York attorneys had sued the defendant for the value of the services
rendered. Jurisdiction was predicated upon CPLR 302(a)(1). The
second department, in reversing, adopted Professor McLaughlin's
position that the court should not become "ensnarled in the technical
rules of agency."'46 Having decided that "all of [the] activities were
40 It is interesting to note that Judge Tyler expressed his displeasure with the
manner in which jurisdictional questions are answered by the courts. 297 F. Supp. at
1150 n.l:
Typically the jurisdictional problem has helped to delay the progress of this case,
filed in 1965. A powerful argument can be made for the proposition that delays in
resolving these jurisdictional questions are caused by two judicially created
phenomena: adherence to a factual case-by-case approach to "find" contacts of
the defendant in the forum state and insistence that such factual issues be heard
and resolved at a stage earlier than that when such issues are normally resolved
in the litigation process. . . . Conceding that hardship in occasional, extreme
cases might result if jurisdictional disputes were deferred until trial, this
disability would be more than offset by the savings in court time and litigants'
money.
41 See generally United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 289, 250-59 (2d Cir.)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919, rehearing denied, 384 US. 982 (1966)
for more detailed analysis of "exclusive agencies" and jurisdiction.
42297 F. Supp. at 1152. The "purposeful acts" doctrine was born in Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), wherein the court stated that "it is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws." Id. at 253.
43See 297 F. Supp. at 1151.
44 32 App. Div. 2d 422, 302 N.Y.S.2d 961 (2d Dep't 1969).
45 Elman v. Belson, 58 Misc.2d '271, 298 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968),
rev'd, 32 App. Div. 2d 422, 302 N.Y.S.2d 961 (2d Dep't 1969). See The Quarterly Survey,
44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 313, 321 (1969).
46 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 301, supp. commentary 89, 92 (1968).
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conducted for [the defendant] even though he now chooses not to
recognize them," 47 the court sustained jurisdiction on the basis that the
defendant had engaged in purposeful activities in New York.
While both a federal district court and the second department
have apparently discarded the distinction between "agents" and "independent contractors" for some jurisdictional purposes, the distinction
may nevertheless have continued vitality in certain situations. For
each of the cases noted dealt with an action by a third party rather than
the case involving a suit brought by an agent against his principal.
Significantly, each court has recognized that different criteria may apply
in the latter instance. 4s Thus, whether or not this capricious distinction
will linger even in that situation is yet to be determined. And harsh
inequities may continue to be wrought until this last vestige of the
agent-independent contractor distinction is discarded for jurisdictional
purposes.
CPLR 302(a)(3): Guidelines established for applicabilityof subsection.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York has refused to interpret CPLR 302(a)(3) in a manner that might
have subjected many local nonresident suppliers to increased litigation
in New York. In Chunky v. Blumenthal Brothers Chocolate Co.,49 a

New York candy manufacturer (Chunky) sued Blumenthal Brothers
Chocolate Co. (hereinafter Blumenthal), a Pennsylvania chocolate
manufacturer, for damages arising from the sale of allegedly contaminated chocolate. Blumenthal, in turn, brought third-party actions
against a Chicago-based milk wholesaler, H.C. Christians Co. (hereinafter Christians), and a Pennsylvania dairy, Grover Farms, Inc. (hereinafter Grover), contending that the milk produced by Grover and sold
by Christians had caused the alleged contamination. It should be
noted that Christians acted only as a middleman for Grover and
Blumenthal; it had neither produced nor delivered any of the milk in
question.
Blumenthal predicated jurisdiction over Grover and Christians
upon CPLR 302(a)(3). The latter two corporations, however, contended that jurisdiction could not be acquired in such manner since
the injury to Blumenthal, if any, had been caused entirely without the
state, i.e., in Pennsylvania. The court quickly disposed of this contention, declaring that the primary action between Chunky and Blum47 82 App. Div. 2d at 425, 302 N.YS.2d at 964.
48 Compare297 F. Supp. at 1152 with 32 App. Div. 2d at 425, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
49299 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

